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Abstract: In recent years, much public attention has been devoted to the existence of 
pay discrepancies between men and women at the upper end of the income scale. For 
example, there has been considerable discussion of the “Hollywood gender pay gap”. 
We can refer to such discrepancies as cases of millionaire inequality. These cases generate 
conflicting intuitions. On the one hand, the unequal remuneration involved looks like 
a troubling case of gender injustice. On the other, it’s natural to feel uneasy when 
confronted with the suggestion that multi-millionaires are somehow being paid 
inadequately. In this paper, we consider two arguments for rectifying millionaire 
inequality, clarifying their appeal but also identifying the obstacles that each will have 











1. Introduction  
In July 2017, the BBC published a list detailing the salaries of its top earners, which 
revealed a significant gender pay gap among its presenters. Only a third of those on the 
list were women, and there were substantial pay differences between men and women 
who were similarly placed in the corporation. For example, despite both joining the 
BBC in the 1980s, and despite both being lead presenters on similar programmes, Huw 
Edwards’s salary was revealed to be approximately £200,000 higher than that of Fiona 
Bruce (Grierson 2017). Pay inequality of this kind is not unique to the UK, nor is it 
unique to the television industry. The Hollywood actor, Jennifer Lawrence, and the 
tennis star, Serena Williams, have each been involved in highly publicised pay disputes. 
Both have argued that they are paid less than their male counterparts because they are 
female (Lawrence 2015; Williams 2017).1 These are cases of millionaire inequality.2 
When such cases are discussed in the media, they are standardly followed by a call to 
action. In a letter addressed to Tony Hall, the Director-General of the BBC, Fiona 
Bruce and her fellow female top earners write: ‘You have said that you will ‘sort’ the 
gender pay gap by 2020, but the BBC has known about the pay disparity for years. We 
 
1 As there are no commonly used adjectives to denote gender in English, we use ‘male’ and ‘female’ to 
refer to men and women. 
2 Of course, in quotidian usage, any disparity in earnings among millionaires constitutes a millionaire 
inequality, but in this paper we use the phrase to refer exclusively to cases where female millionaires are 
paid less than their male counterparts, apparently on the basis of their gender. 
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all want to go on the record to call upon you to act now’ (The Telegraph 2017). 
Similarly, on Black Women’s Equal Pay Day, Serena Williams authored an essay 
stating that: ‘We need to push this issue to the front of conversations so that employers 
across the U.S. can truly understand that all male and female employees must be 
compensated equally. Not close. Not almost the same. Equally’ (2017). 
Cases of millionaire inequality generate conflicting intuitions. On the one hand, the 
unequal remuneration involved looks like a troubling case of gender injustice. These 
inequalities constitute one further example of the multiple ways in which our ostensibly 
liberal societies subordinate women’s interests to those of men. On the other hand, it’s 
natural to feel uneasy when confronted with the suggestion that multimillionaires are 
somehow being paid inadequately. Indeed, this sense of unease is registered by some 
of the most outspoken critics of millionaire inequality. In an essay addressing the issue, 
Lawrence writes: ‘It’s hard for me to speak about my experience as a working woman 
because I can safely say my problems aren’t exactly relatable.’ After suggesting that she 
had refrained from negotiating for higher pay, Lawrence notes: ‘I didn’t want to keep 
fighting over millions of dollars that, frankly … I don’t need’ (2015). 
Indeed, it might be suggested that the attention devoted to these inequalities vindicates 
various misgivings recently expressed by some radical feminists. Condemnation of the 
‘Hollywood pay gap’ prompts one to recall Nancy Fraser’s lament that ‘feminist ideas 
that once formed part of a radical worldview are increasingly expressed in individualist 
terms’ (2013). Elaborating on the nature of her concern, Fraser comments: ‘Where 
feminists once criticised a society that promoted careerism, they now advise women to 




In this respect, the campaign against millionaire inequality differs markedly from the 
concurrent #metoo campaign, which exposed the disturbing extent of sexual assault 
and harassment against women. Whereas the former can elicit ambivalence, the latter 
often attracts unreserved support. This is surely because, while we are confident in our 
judgements about the wrongness of sexual assault, establishing the wrongness of 
millionaire inequality is considerably more difficult.3 
How, then, might one make the case for rectifying millionaire inequality? In this paper 
we identify and evaluate two distinct arguments.4 They are as follows: 
1. The Fairness Argument: We should rectify millionaire inequalities 
because they are unfair, and they are unfair because they are 
attributable to differences in gender, which are morally arbitrary. 
 
3 We do not deny that, in practice, the two phenomena are rooted in the same soil, namely, the 
occupation by men of many or most of society's positions of power. But for the purpose of this paper, we 
focus on the analytically distinct questions surrounding millionaire inequalities. 
4 We recognise that these are not the only ways in which to justify rectifying millionaire inequality. For 
example, we might think that tackling millionaire inequality is important not because doing so benefits 
millionaires, but because it serves the interests of women who are considerably less advantaged. Fiona 
Bruce and other female high earners suggest this line of reasoning in their letter to the Director-General 
of the BBC, emphasising that ‘[t]his is an opportunity for those of us with strong and loud voices to use 
them on behalf of all’. See The Telegraph (2017). Perhaps the most serious problem with this view is 
that, if what motivates the argument is a concern for the plight of low income women, it’s natural to 
wonder why, instead of supporting the campaign against millionaire inequality, we should not opt 
instead to support policies aimed specifically at removing the injustices that these women face. For some 
additional reasons to be sceptical of this argument, see Gheaus (forthcoming).  
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2. The Discrimination Argument: We should rectify millionaire 
inequalities because the victims are subjects of wrongful 
discrimination.  
We address these arguments in turn, clarifying their appeal but also identifying the 
obstacles that defenders of each will have to surmount in order to succeed. We register 
our support for (a particular version of) the second, discrimination-based, argument, 
while casting doubt on the efficacy of the first. In our conclusion, we explore the 
distinctiveness of cases of millionaire inequality by reflecting on the extent to which our 
conclusions generalise beyond society’s very highest earners. 
Before we begin, there are three prefatory points to be made. First, the statements of 
the three arguments above claim that ‘we’ should rectify millionaire inequalities. This 
formulation is used as shorthand for the claim that one should support calls to rectify 
millionaire inequality because there are compelling moral reasons to do so. If there 
really are compelling moral reasons to rectify millionaire inequality, a further question 
asks who should do the rectifying. In particular, should the rectification be enforced by 
the state? We shall take no stance on this question. 
Second, we take millionaire inequality to be an example of a broader phenomenon, 
namely, putatively morally problematic pay inequalities among the relatively well-
endowed. Thus, while we focus throughout specifically on the case of gender-based 
inequalities, the arguments we develop may shed similar light on related trends, such 
as Hollywood’s race pay gap. Our reason for limiting our investigation to the gender 
pay gap in particular is only because doing so enables us to focus and direct sustained 
philosophical attention towards an interesting, distinctive, and politically salient set of 
questions that warrant closer scrutiny. 
2 
 
Third, we acknowledge that we are not the first to consider cases of this kind. In 
particular, our analysis contributes to a debate recently triggered by Anca Gheaus’s 
treatment of related topics (forthcoming; unpublished manuscript). Our intention is to 
complement Gheaus’s analysis by further exploring the intricacies of these issues, as 
well as the relevance of a variety of additional factors that don’t arise in her discussion 
of these matters. 
2. The Fairness Argument  
2.1 Introducing the Fairness Argument 
The Fairness Argument holds that millionaire inequalities are morally objectionable 
because they are unfair, and that we should rectify such inequalities because of this 
unfairness. This argument draws on the idea that it’s unfair for some individuals to 
receive less favourable remuneration than others simply in virtue of factors that are 
morally arbitrary. Female millionaires who are paid less generously than their male 
counterparts simply because they are women are disadvantaged by a morally arbitrary 
factor, their gender, and are therefore treated unfairly. 
We can characterise morally arbitrary factors in one of two related but distinct ways. 
We can take a factor to be morally arbitrary (i) if it fails to track individual choice and 
responsibility, or (ii) if it fails to track any consideration that we could plausibly regard 
as a determinant of one’s entitlements.5 When it comes to explicating the unfairness of 
 
5 Those who characterise morally arbitrary factors as those that fail to track individual choice also often 
believe that individual choice is the one consideration that ought to affect one’s life prospects (though 
they need not think that one should always have to bear the consequences that happen to attach to a 
particular choice under particular circumstances). Those who characterise morally arbitrary factors as 
those that fail to track any considerations that should affect one’s life prospects might accept that certain 
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granting less favourable treatment to members of a particular gender, the second notion 
of moral arbitrariness seems more appropriate than the first. To see why, imagine a 
science-fiction scenario in which we are able to choose our gender freely before entering 
society. There may be good reasons why one might choose to be a woman even if one 
knows that society is structured in a manner that burdens women with socioeconomic 
disadvantages. But one’s choice to be a woman does not deprive one of justice-based 
resources with which to criticise the inegalitarian nature of one’s society. It remains the 
case that there is no good reason why socio-economic disadvantages should attach to 
that choice. One’s gender remains morally arbitrary in the second sense distinguished 
above. 
As a property that is morally arbitrary in this sense, one’s gender contrasts with a 
number of other considerations that might plausibly be regarded as relevant to a moral 
assessment of distributive outcomes. It’s prima facie plausible that someone who 
performs a job that is especially socially valuable or arduous should enjoy higher pay 
than someone who occupies a less valuable or burdensome position. But it’s not at all 
plausible that someone should enjoy higher or lower pay than others simply in virtue 
of their gender. 
The Fairness Argument is intuitively attractive. However, in the next subsection we 
demonstrate that it’s defeated by what we shall call the Excess Objection. But before 
proceeding, let’s note that there are two ways in which millionaire inequalities could 
be rectified. These can be described using Jennifer Lawrence as our example of a female 
 
factors not attributable to choice (such as the distribution of natural talent) can justly influence people’s 
prospects, and therefore count as non-arbitrary. On the different conceptions of moral arbitrariness 
present in the literature, see Caney (2009: 396-397). 
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victim of millionaire inequality and Christian Bale as our example of a male beneficiary 
of millionaire inequality. The first rectificatory strategy is to raise Lawrence’s pay to 
the level of Bale’s; the second rectificatory strategy is to lower Bale’s pay to the level of 
Lawrence’s.6 We develop the Excess Objection with the first rectificatory strategy in 
mind, but, at the end of the subsection, we show how it also impugns the second as 
well. 
2.2 The Excess Objection  
According to the Excess Objection, female millionaires, like their male counterparts, 
already have more than their just share of resources, and we cannot plausibly maintain 
that they have a fairness-based claim to even more. The details of this objection, which 
we endorse, are as follows.7  In a just society, the excess wealth of the super-rich would 
be taxed away. The higher rewards for female millionaires recommended by the first 
rectificatory strategy would, if paid, be immediately expropriated by the state. 
Moreover, in the absence of just tax-and-transfer arrangements, the super-rich have a 
moral obligation to relinquish their fortunes voluntarily (e.g. by donating them to 
charity). The most compelling theories of distributive justice yield the conclusion that 
the excess wealth of the super-rich should be regarded as morally analogous to stolen 
 
6 A third rectificatory strategy is to raise Lawrence’s pay to some point between her current pay and 
Bale’s current pay, and lower Bale’s to the same level. As this strategy raises no distinctive normative 
issues, we set it aside.  
7 For a similar defence of this objection, see Gheaus (forthcoming). Our analysis goes beyond Gheaus’s 
in that we distinguish different versions of this objection, corresponding to three distinct ways in fairness 
might interact with the needs of the world’s poor. We elaborate on this below.  
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loot. The fact that the loot in question is distributed unequally does not provide those 
who receive less with a fairness-based claim to more. 
A variety of familiar reasons support the claim that inordinately large accumulations of 
wealth among individuals have no place in a just society.8 Some egalitarians argue that 
it’s simply unfair for some people to have so much more than others, given that brute 
luck inevitably plays a prominent role in determining who gets what. Others explain 
the injustice of large inequalities by pointing to the pernicious effects that they 
engender. These egalitarians argue that large economic inequalities often translate into 
inequalities of power, and that the better-off are often able to dominate or control the 
lives of the less advantaged in objectionable ways (Schemmel 2011). Furthermore, large 
disparities of wealth can undermine the fairness of certain political procedures, and 
impede the creation of genuinely equal opportunities in education and the labour 
market (Christiano 2012). 
But perhaps the most powerful and straightforward objection to large inequalities is that 
they represent a failed opportunity to rectify severe disadvantage. This objection, which 
can be effectively mobilised to serve our ends, focuses on absolute deprivation, and 
makes no reference to the idea that it’s necessarily bad for some to fare worse than 
others in merely comparative terms.9 As T. M. Scanlon writes: 
In some cases our reason for favoring the elimination of inequalities is at base a 
humanitarian concern – a concern, for example, to alleviate suffering. If some 
people are living under terrible conditions, while others are very well off indeed, 
 
8 For a helpful taxonomy of arguments against inequality, see Scanlon (2002). See also Robeyns (2017). 
9 What we are concerned with is ‘the hunger of the hungry, the need of the needy, the suffering of the ill, 
and so on’ (Raz 1986: 240). 
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then a transfer of resources from the better to the worse off, if it can be 
accomplished without other bad effects, is desirable as a way of alleviating suffering 
without creating new hardships of comparable severity (2002: 42). 
It’s no secret that in our world there are not merely ‘some’, but a great many people 
living under terrible conditions. More than 700 million people survive each day on less 
than what could be purchased in the United States for $1.90 (Human Development 
Report 2016: 29). Each year, almost 6 million children die before reaching the age of 
five, and nearly half of these children lose their lives because they do not have enough 
food (Human Development Report 2016: 30; Hug, Sharrow, and You 2017: 3). 
Moreover, those involved in movements like ‘Effective Altruism’ have drawn our 
attention to the fact that these kinds of deprivations can be ameliorated at little cost. 
For example, Peter Singer points out that a donation of $250 could provide rehydration 
therapy to a child who would otherwise die from diarrhoea (Singer 2009: 88-89). 
It’s these well-known facts about the extreme poverty that disfigures our world, and 
about the ease with which it can be mitigated, that make the extravagant fortunes of 
the super-rich so instinctively repellent. It’s also such facts that provide the strongest 
support for our claim that these fortunes should be seen as analogous to stolen loot. 
Given the crushing burdens endured by the world’s poorest people, the super-wealthy 
can have no just claim to the enormous wealth that they have amassed. Like thieves in 
possession of stolen goods, the rich must relinquish their holdings. 
But how, exactly, does the Excess Objection defeat the Fairness Argument? This 
depends on how we conceive of fairness as a value and on how considerations of 
fairness interact with the needs of the world’s poor. The Excess Objection might defeat 
the Fairness Argument in three possible ways, which we can again describe using 
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Lawrence and Bale as our respective examples of victims and beneficiaries of 
millionaire inequality. 
First, we might concede that Lawrence does suffer some morally problematic 
unfairness. After all, Lawrence is paid less than Bale, and, assuming her lower pay is 
attributable to her gender, which is morally arbitrary, this inequality in remuneration is 
certainly unfair. However, because Lawrence (like Bale) already has so much more 
than most, and can contribute to ameliorating the desperate plight of the world’s poor 
at such little cost to herself, she is morally required to tolerate this unfairness all-things-
considered. Indeed, she is morally required to donate much of the wealth that she 
already possesses to charity. Raising Lawrence’s pay would enlarge that portion of her 
holdings that she is morally required to relinquish. On this account of how the Excess 
Objection defeats the Fairness Argument, each raises distinct moral concerns (of fairness 
and, say, basic need fulfilment), and Lawrence’s interest in fairness is outweighed by the 
basic needs of the world’s poor. On this view, fairness is one value to be weighed against 
others. 
The second account is closely related. Again, we begin by conceding that Lawrence 
suffers some morally problematic unfairness. But we then point out that the severe 
burdens borne by the world’s poorest individuals, and the radical inequality between 
these individuals and people like Lawrence, are themselves a product of unfairness. 
Lawrence has been spared various misfortunes – such as being born into an 
impoverished country – that have devastated the lives of millions, while being blessed 
with various advantages, arbitrary from the point of view of morality, that enable her 
to lead an extraordinarily privileged life. On this account, Lawrence’s interest in 
fairness conflicts with the interest that the world’s poor have in fairness. And, because 
the unfairness suffered by the latter is so much greater than the unfairness suffered by 
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Lawrence, and exposes its victims to such catastrophic disadvantages, it’s the claims of 
the world’s poor that win out. Here, the Excess Objection and the Fairness Argument 
raise similar (fairness-related) moral concerns of different gravity. And, once again, 
Lawrence’s interest in fairness is outweighed. 
The third account of how the Excess Objection defeats the Fairness Argument is more 
distinctive. The general idea at the heart of the Fairness Argument is that unfairness 
obtains when some individuals receive fewer goods than others simply in virtue of 
factors that are morally arbitrary. This is a plausible claim. But it’s also plausible to hold 
that the value of fairness is conditional. Sometimes, the fact that a particular 
distribution of goods is fairer than others provides no reason at all to favour that 
distribution.10 More specifically, the fact that a particular distribution of goods is fairer 
than others provides no reason to favour that distribution when the goods in question 
are not justly held. The Excess Objection reveals that the wealth of millionaires like 
Lawrence and Bale is not justly held; these millionaires are morally required to 
relinquish their holdings. Unlike the two previously stated accounts, the present 
account identifies no morally problematic unfairness in the unequal pay between the two 
actors. Therefore, while increasing Lawrence’s pay to the level of Bale’s may succeed 
in rectifying some unfairness, this fact provides no reason to increase Lawrence’s pay. 
Because of this, there is no morally relevant unfairness to weigh against the claims of 
the world’s poor. We can characterise this point by saying that the fairness achieved by 
 
10 We might say that fairness is an ‘occasional value’. See Estlund (2008: 68). 
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rectifying millionaire inequality has no intrinsic value.11 We can call this the No Intrinsic 
Value Claim. 
While the first two accounts of how the Excess Objection defeats the Fairness 
Argument hold that the unfairness suffered by Lawrence is outweighed – either by a 
concern for the basic needs of the world’s poor or by their interest in fairness – the third 
account that we have just sketched denies that the unfairness suffered by Lawrence 
constitutes any value that we should place on the scales. It premises this denial on what 
we can call the Just Holdings Condition, according to which improving the fairness of a 
distribution is intrinsically valuable only when the distribuenda are justly held. To see 
whether this condition is plausible, let’s consider two scenarios:12 
Slaves: The government of a slave state distributes slaves on a random basis 
to its citizens. Consequently, some citizens end up owning more slaves than 
others. Responding to complaints of unfairness, the government reallocates 
the slaves, ensuring that they are distributed equally among the citizenry. 
Pizza: A pizza ordered by their housemate is received by Arthur and Brenda, 
who decide to keep it for themselves. Brenda proposes a 2:1 division, but 
when Arthur complains that this is unfair, Brenda agrees to divide the pizza 
equally. 
 
11 This way of conceiving of fairness – as only conditionally valuable – coheres with a natural 
understanding of various other virtues. For example, bravery lacks value when exhibited in the pursuit 
of unjust ends. Similarly, loyalty is not valuable when shown to malevolent individuals.  
12 The cases are modified from Gheaus (forthcoming).  
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We imagine that most readers will share our intuitive judgement that, even if the 
government reallocation in Slaves is conducive to fairness, this fact provides no reason 
to favour the reallocation. Fairness has no intrinsic value here and, as Gheaus plausibly 
notes, one natural explanation of this result is that the distribuenda in question (slaves) 
are not justly held: ‘the reform cannot cater to any individual’s claim of justice: Nobody 
should hold slaves, hence nobody has a claim to an opportunity to hold slaves’ 
(forthcoming). 
Our judgement regarding Pizza is analogous. The fairness of the equal division has no 
intrinsic value given that the pizza is not rightfully theirs. However, we recognize that 
some readers may demur from our analysis of Pizza, believing that a fair distribution of 
the stolen pizza has some intrinsic value. Some readers might hold that, if an equal 
division really is fairer than Brenda’s original proposal, then that fact provides a reason 
to favour the former in this case. Those who are willing to countenance this view must 
abandon the Just Holdings Condition. Moreover, those readers who do not want to 
jettison the belief that we have no fairness-based reason to favour the reallocation in 
Slaves must provide an explanation of our conflicting judgements in the two cases.  
One candidate-explanation is as follows. While it’s possible to own a pizza permissibly, 
it’s not possible to own a slave permissibly: owning slaves is always unjust, whereas 
owning a pizza is not. Because owning slaves is never permissible, distributing slaves 
fairly cannot be a virtue. By contrast, because it’s possible to own pizza permissibly, 
improving the fairness of a distribution of pizza can be a virtue, even when the pizza is 
unjustly held. 
If this is an adequate explanation of why a fair distribution of unjustly held goods can 
be an intrinsic virtue under some circumstances but not under others, then we should 
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concede that there are reasons of fairness to rectify millionaire inequalities, since money 
(like pizza but unlike slaves) can be held justly. However, we do not find this 
explanation appealing.  While we can certainly distinguish between things that can and 
cannot be permissibly held, employing this distinction to justify the rectification of 
millionaire inequalities is puzzling. The fact that a particular good can be justly held 
might help to establish why ensuring a fair distribution of that good can be intrinsically 
valuable. But it does not help to establish that a fair distribution of that good can be 
intrinsically valuable even when the good is not justly held. In the absence of a 
compelling reason to believe that the fairness of a distribution of unjustly held goods is 
a virtue, we should reject the current explanation.  
An alternative explanation of why a fair distribution of unjustly held goods can be 
intrinsically valuable under some circumstances but not under others refers to the 
degree of injustice that individuals suffer in being deprived of their just holdings 
(Gheaus forthcoming). When some people own slaves, others suffer massive 
deprivations. By contrast, the retention of stolen pizza translates into a trifling burden 
for the rightful owner. Because slaves are deprived of their most basic entitlements, a 
fair distribution of slaves cannot be intrinsically valuable. The fairness is robbed of its 
value by the gravity of the injustice involved. By contrast, we might think that, because 
the wrongness of retaining stolen pizza is so minor, the intrinsic value of a fair 
distribution is not extinguished.  
Supposing that this is a plausible explanation, the relevant question for present purposes 
is as follows: does the unfairness of millionaire inequality have more in common with 
an unfair distribution of slaves or with an unfair distribution of stolen pizza? For 
reasons that should by now be apparent, our view is that it has more in common with 
the former (though we do not suggest that being rich is as bad as being a slave owner). 
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The hoarding of excess wealth by the super-rich constitutes the withholding of resources 
that could otherwise be used to ameliorate the desperate plight of the world’s poor, and 
the super-rich are morally obligated to donate this wealth to effective poverty-relief 
organisations.13 It’s because the hoarding of excess wealth translates into massive 
deprivations for others, and because the costs of avoiding this outcome are so small, 
that millionaire inequality cases have more in common with Slaves than Pizza. In virtue 
of these features, measures to rectify millionaire inequality are strong candidates for 
fairness-promoting actions that lack intrinsic value. 
It’s worth emphasising at this point that, in our view, the Just Holdings Condition is 
correct: improving the fairness of a distribution is intrinsically valuable only when the 
distribuenda are justly held, and the degree of injustice involved when the distribuenda 
are not justly held is immaterial. We went in search of an alternative defence of the No 
Intrinsic Value Claim only because we acknowledge that some readers may be reluctant 
to accept some implications of the Just Holdings Condition. By demonstrating that we 
can vindicate the No Intrinsic Value Claim even if we reject the Just Holdings 
Condition, we hope to have strengthened our position. 
The implications of our view may be radical, but they are not as nihilistic as one might 
initially suspect. This is because, though the number of people who have more than 
their just share may be high, so too is the number of people who have less than their 
 
13 These two points can come apart. My retention of my left kidney constitutes the withholding of a 
resource that could otherwise be used to ameliorate the desperate plight of someone with end-stage 
chronic kidney disease, but still I might not be morally required to donate my left kidney. It’s because 
the super-rich can donate their excess wealth at such trifling cost to themselves that they are morally 
required to do so.  
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just share, and our view does not imply that fairness cannot have intrinsic value among 
this latter group of people. Suppose that a development agency is distributing medicine 
among the inhabitants of an impoverished village but, due to under-funding, it does not 
have enough medicine to go around. Assuming that everyone in the village has a just 
claim to the medicine, it follows that injustice will inevitably obtain. But it does not 
follow that, by seeking to distribute the medicine in a fair manner, the agency does 
nothing of intrinsic value. If distributive fairness requires that all those who have a just 
claim to the medicine have an equal chance of receiving it, say, then we should 
acknowledge that satisfying this standard is intrinsically valuable.14 Thus, even when 
justice is unachievable, ensuring a fair distribution can still be a virtue. 
In developing the Excess Objection, we have had the Fairness Argument’s first 
rectificatory strategy in mind. That is, we have focused on the claim that we should 
increase Lawrence’s pay to the level of Bale’s. But we are now in a position to see how 
our arguments also impugn the second rectificatory strategy, according to which we 
should decrease Bale’s pay to the level of Lawrence’s. We can concede that this strategy 
conduces to the achievement of fairness by eliminating a morally arbitrary inequality. 
But if the No Intrinsic Value Claim is correct – and we have offered two independent 
arguments for this verdict – then this fairness is not of any intrinsic value. 
Of course, if the money withheld from Bale were donated to a poverty relief 
organisation, then decreasing Bale’s pay would be commendable. But this does not 
vindicate the Fairness Argument, for the Fairness Argument recommends decreasing 
Bale’s pay in order to address Lawrence’s fairness complaint, not in order to benefit the 
world’s poor. Similarly, we might commend decreasing Bale’s pay on the grounds that 
 
14 For a similar case, see Casal (2007: 307).  
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it reduces the degree to which his holdings exceed his just share. But, again, this 
observation does not salvage the Fairness Argument. 
In case some readers are sceptical of the No Intrinsic Value Claim, it’s worth noting 
that the considerations adduced in our presentation of the Excess Objection ground an 
additional argument against the second rectificatory strategy. As we have accepted 
throughout, Lawrence suffers some unfairness. She is paid less than Bale, and her lower 
pay appears to be attributable to a morally arbitrary factor. But as we have also 
emphasised, Lawrence’s holdings are unjust. These holdings comprise resources that 
Lawrence is morally required to relinquish. Now, the second rectificatory strategy 
recommends eliminating the unfairness between Lawrence and Bale by reducing Bale’s 
pay to the level of Lawrence’s. One problem here is that, in doing so, it also appears to 
offer a normative endorsement of Lawrence’s pay. It states that we should maintain 
Lawrence’s pay, and that other millionaires such as Bale ought to be remunerated at 
the same level. But Lawrence’s pay is unjust. These observations reveal that the second 
rectificatory strategy is vitiated by a narrowness of vision. It focuses myopically on the 
morally irrelevant micro-unfairness between Lawrence and Bale, while ignoring larger 
problems. As a result of this tunnel vision, it ends up sanctioning injustice. 
Our conclusion, then, is that the Fairness Argument for rectifying millionaire inequality 
is unsuccessful. In the next section, we examine an alternative case for rectifying 
millionaire inequality. 
3. The Discrimination Argument  
In this section, we set aside considerations of fairness and instead examine the claim 
that female victims of millionaire inequality suffer from a form of wrongful 
discrimination. At the outset, it bears noting that discrimination raises concerns that 
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are distinct from those that we considered above. This is because an individual can be 
a victim of discrimination even when she is denied goods that would constitute unjust 
holdings or to which she is otherwise not entitled. To see this, consider the case of a job 
applicant who is unqualified for the job to which she applies, but whom is denied an 
interview not on these grounds, but because she is black. Clearly, the applicant is the 
victim of wrongful discrimination, even though she is not entitled to the job in question. 
This insight is important since we might draw parallel conclusions in cases of 
millionaire inequality, namely that Lawrence and other female millionaires paid less 
than their male counterparts are victims of wrongful discrimination, despite the fact 
that they are not entitled to the higher income that they are denied. This is the 
Discrimination Argument.  
3.1 Discrimination and Market Demand  
What makes discrimination wrong? According to one view, discrimination can be 
wrong in virtue of the discriminator’s bad intentions (Alexander 1992; Slavny and Parr 
2015). The strongest intuitive support for this judgement is provided by reflection on 
cases like the one described above, where an unqualified applicant is denied a job on 
explicitly prejudiced grounds.15 Here, the character of the employer’s intention is 
sufficient to render her decision wrongfully discriminatory, and thus we need not 
appeal to any other considerations in order to deliver the conclusion that the applicant 
is a victim of a serious injustice. We can call this the Intention-Based Discrimination 
Argument. 
 
15 In fact, even critics of the relevance of intentions to permissibility recognise the force of such cases. See 
Scanlon (2008: 69-70).  
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We suspect that some cases of millionaire inequality involve discrimination of this kind, 
which is performed by employers acting on explicitly sexist motives (and recent charges 
brought against certain Hollywood producers has strengthened this suspicion). Under 
these circumstances, it’s straightforward to establish wrongful discrimination and we 
should condemn the treatment on this basis. However, in other cases, those who 
determine the salaries of female millionaires might not be motivated by explicit 
prejudice, such as sexist beliefs, and may instead be responding to variations in the level 
of market demand for the talents of male and female stars. One possibility is that, when 
differences in earnings between victims and beneficiaries of millionaire inequality are 
generated in this way, there is no wrongful discrimination. We can call this the Market 
Demand Reply to the Intention-Based Discrimination Argument. 
Two considerations support this reply.16 First, even if the contributions of male and 
female millionaires seem relevantly identical at first blush, closer examination may 
reveal subtle differences between them. For example, male tennis players typically 
exhibit higher levels of strength, stamina, and speed than their female counterparts. 
Thus, there can be variations in the goods that the relevant employees produce. Second, 
even when this is not the case, differences may still emerge simply in virtue of variations 
in others’ reactions to apparently identical goods. For example, it may be that audiences 
tend to prefer watching male news presenters to equally talented female ones. The point 
is not that male news presenters are typically more talented than female news 
presenters, in any technical sense of that claim. It’s possible that both sets of presenters 
 




perform identically well, but that audiences still happen to respond more positively to 
male news presenters than female ones.  
In practice, it’s often difficult to discern which of these factors affects market demand 
in a given case, since this task is an epistemically complex one and the line between the 
two factors is blurred, even at the conceptual level. As Iris Marion Young notes, market 
evaluations of qualifications and contributions of individuals are greatly influenced by 
societal values, such as whether they incorporate norm-following behaviour, social 
competencies, and conform to role expectations (e.g. expectations toward women that 
differ from those toward men). Because of this, it’s practically difficult to separate 
variations in goods from variations in reactions (Young 2011: ch. 7).17  
The difficulty of determining the exact basis of market demand is important for two 
reasons. First, it casts doubt on the claim that those who determine millionaires’ salaries 
must be motivated by explicit prejudice, including sexist beliefs (which is not to deny 
that they sometimes are). According to the Market Demand Reply, some millionaire 
inequalities are better understood as tracking differences in the goods produced by 
different celebrities and/or variations in consumer reactions to those goods. Second, it 
may be possible to appeal to these considerations in order to defend some millionaire 
inequalities. According to this defence, it’s justifiable to pay female celebrities less than 
their male counterparts when and because this reflects the lower level of market demand 
for their services. This is the view of the tennis player, Novak Djokovic, who has 
claimed that tennis players’ salaries should reflect ‘who attracts more attention, 
spectators and who sells more tickets’ (BBC News 2016). 
 
17 See also Gheaus (forthcoming) for further discussion of the ways in implicit biases shape the 
opportunities and evaluations of women. 
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The Market Demand Reply appeals to the suggestion that, when determining 
Lawrence’s pay, some employers may be responding to the level of market demand for 
her talents, rather than acting on bad intentions. What should we make of the Market 
Demand Reply? A first response invokes the fact that political philosophers disagree 
about whether and why differences in the level of market demand for employees’ 
services can justify inequalities in pay. For example, proponents of some forms of 
radical egalitarianism believe that the fact that an individual’s services are in high 
demand never justifies paying her more than someone whose service are in low demand 
(Cohen 2008). Those drawn to this view will be unpersuaded by the Market Demand 
Reply, believing that the misfortune of lacking talents that are in greater demand is as 
morally arbitrary as gender and race, and so allowing salaries to depend on this factor 
is as wrongfully discriminatory as allowing salaries to depend on these other attributes. 
However, since this rejection of market mechanisms is controversial, and because the 
relevant considerations have been explored at length elsewhere, we shall set it aside.  
A second response holds that the Market Demand Reply merely passes the buck. More 
specifically, it suggests that even if employers are not wrongfully discriminating against 
female victims of millionaire inequality, perhaps consumers are doing so. According to 
this line of argument, consumers act on wrongfully discriminatory preferences that 
generate an incentive for employers to offer lower pay to female actors than to their 
male co-stars. By focusing on consumers’ preferences, we can uphold the verdict that 
Lawrence is a victim of intention-based wrongful discrimination without laying the 
blame at the door of an employer, who may simply be responding to market demand.  
In order to sustain this response, it’s necessary to do more than show that consumers’ 
preferences generate an incentive for producers to offer lower salaries to Lawrence and 
other female celebrities. In particular, proponents of this reply must show that 
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consumers are motivated by explicit prejudice, or have a similarly morally defective 
kind of intention. (From the perspective of the Intention-Based Discrimination 
Argument, if consumers’ intentions are entirely innocent, then there can be nothing 
more objectionable about the inequality in income between Lawrence and Bale than 
the inequality in income between a highly talented actor and a weak actor.) However, 
this task is not straightforward, since the judgements that inform consumers’ 
preferences regarding female actors can be very different from the obviously morally 
defective intentions of an employer who rejects an applicant on explicitly racist 
grounds. Certainly, consumers with a stronger preference for seeing Bale than 
Lawrence need not exhibit the kind of animus and explicit prejudice that motivates the 
employer in the case with which we began and that are necessary to classify the 
employer’s act as intentionally malicious.  
In the light of these facts, we conclude that the Intention-Based Discrimination 
Argument is likely to fail. But we cannot infer from this that we must reject the 
Discrimination Argument tout court. This is because employers and/or consumers may 
be engaged in forms of wrongful discrimination against female millionaires that do not 
rely on the nature of their intentions. In the remainder of this section, we explore these 
possibilities in greater detail.    
3.2 Reconsidering the Market Demand Reply    
One problem with the Market Demand Reply is that it adopts an uncritical attitude 
towards consumer preferences and the inequalities that these preferences generate. In 
particular, it fails to recognise that, irrespective of whether these preferences are 
explicitly prejudiced in themselves, they may have been generated under unjust or 
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otherwise problematic circumstances, and this may make a difference to our moral 
evaluation of the inequalities that emerge from them.  
For example, unjust gender-related social norms play a significant role in shaping our 
preferences and expectations about goods and services (Haslanger 2015). Social norms 
determine which roles men and women are expected to fulfil, often to the disadvantage 
of the latter (Haslanger 1993; Young 2011: 193-197). This is important because, 
irrespective of whether consumers’ preferences are themselves explicitly sexist, they are 
often shaped by an unjust culture of sexism. 
Do these considerations show that Lawrence and other female millionaires are victims 
of wrongful discrimination? One way in which those who answer ‘yes’ might support 
this judgement is by appealing to the fact that the sexist injustice that characterises our 
world harms Lawrence, in the sense that it renders her worse off economically than she 
would otherwise be. In a world free from sexist injustice, Lawrence’s earnings would 
be greater than at present, more closely equalling the income of Bale. This is because, 
in the absence of sexist injustice, social norms would not pervasively shape consumers’ 
preferences in a way that creates an incentive for producers to offer lower pay to 
Lawrence than to her male co-stars. We can call this the Harm-Based Discrimination 
Argument.18 
Three features of this argument warrant emphasis. First, despite some similarities – for 
example, both are concerned with the distribution of income – the Harm-Based 
Discrimination Argument and the Fairness Argument make rather different claims. 
The Harm-Based Discrimination Argument relies on a counterfactual claim about how 
 
18 For discussion of the idea that discrimination can be wrong when and because it’s harmful, see Lippert-
Rasmussen (2013).  
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Lawrence would have fared economically under alternative conditions, and, in 
particular, about how she would have fared in a world without sexist injustice (Goff 
2016). By contrast, the Fairness Argument invokes an interpersonal claim about how 
Lawrence fares economically in comparison with other individuals, and, in particular, 
about how she fares in comparison with her male co-stars.  
Second, the success of the Harm-Based Discrimination Argument does not depend on 
the controversial premise that consumers act wrongly when expressing a stronger 
preference for Bale over Lawrence, or for Djokovic over Williams. The argument 
appeals to the more modest claim that consumers’ preferences may be shaped by sexist 
background injustice and that we should be sensitive to the harmful effects that this 
may have on people’s earnings. It’s consistent with this latter claim that consumers’ 
preferences, though shaped by unjust social norms, are not themselves unjust. 
Third, the Harm-Based Discrimination Argument’s core claim is that female 
millionaires are wronged because they fare less well economically than they would if 
consumers’ preferences were not shaped by sexist social norms. In order to make sense 
of this idea, we do not need to commit to any particular account of what makes a social 
norm sexist. It could be because of these norms’ propensity to undermine equality of 
opportunity; it could be because of what they express; or it could be something else. 
We do not need to take a stand on this tricky issue. We take this to be an attractive 
feature of Harm-Based Discrimination Argument since it means that we can combine 
it with a range of different answers to that question.  
However, the Harm-Based Discrimination Argument is vulnerable to an objection, 
which stems from the fact that, though Lawrence is economically worse off than she 
would have been in a world without sexist injustice, it’s not obvious that this is the 
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relevant counterfactual baseline against which to make the comparison. An alternative 
option is to accept what we call the Comprehensive Baseline Claim. This claim holds that 
the relevant comparison for the purposes of the Harm-Based Discrimination Argument 
is with how an individual would have fared in a world without any economic injustice, 
sexist or otherwise. This claim takes seriously the fact that, while Lawrence can 
complain that sexist norms shape consumers’ preferences in a way that renders her less 
well off economically than she would have been in the absence of these unjust norms, 
there are other economic injustices from which Lawrence benefits. In determining 
whether Lawrence is harmed in the relevant sense, we should compare Lawrence’s 
current economic situation with how she would have fared in a world that lacks not 
only the sexist component of economic injustice, but economic injustice more 
generally.19 Since Lawrence is not worse off economically than she would have been in 
the absence of all economic injustice, those who endorse the Comprehensive Baseline 
Claim must deny that she is a victim of wrongful discrimination, according to the 
Harm-Based Discrimination Argument.  
In support of this objection, let’s return to the earlier example of Slaves, in which the 
government of a slave state distributes slaves on a random basis, with the result that 
some citizens end up owning more slaves than others. Now, let’s also suppose that the 
ruling government came to power through an unjust coup d’état, and that the pre-coup 
government distributed slaves more equally. Can a citizen who receives no slaves 
appeal to the Harm-Based Discrimination Argument, citing the fact that she is worse 
 
19 Or rather, we should apply this comparison to the occupants of the generic role ‘elite female actor’. If 
the world had diverged from its actual historical trajectory in the radical way that we are envisioning, it 




off now than she would have been had the unjust coup not occurred? Intuitively, the 
answer is ‘no’, and our analysis helps to make sense of why this is the case. The slaveless 
citizen cannot complain in this way because the pre-coup state of affairs is the wrong 
counterfactual baseline against which to make the comparison. As the Comprehensive 
Baseline Claim states, the slaveless citizen must compare her situation to how she 
would have fared had the unjust coup not occurred and had the pre-coup government 
not been a slave state. Along similar lines, Lawrence and other female millionaires 
cannot appeal to the fact that they would have earned more in a world without 
distributive gender injustice to support the judgement that they are victims of wrongful 
discrimination. They cannot appeal to this fact because they are much better off 
economically than they would be in a world that satisfies not only the requirements of 
distributive gender justice, but also those of distributive justice more generally.  
At this point, one might press an objection against the Comprehensive Baseline Claim. 
We can illustrate this objection by considering a case in which a female millionaire is a 
victim of sexual harassment. It might be said that such harassment need not render this 
millionaire worse off, all-things-considered, than she would be in a fully just world in 
which she is not sexually harassed, but in which she also earns much less than she does 
at present, and that the Comprehensive Baseline Claim therefore prevents us from 
saying that she is harmed. Given that this conclusion is unacceptable, the 
Comprehensive Baseline Claim must be rejected.  
In reply, this objection misunderstands our claim. Our claim is that in order to identify 
the specific kinds of economic harm that concern us, the relevant counterfactual world 
with which to draw comparisons is one that lacks any kind of specifically economic 
injustice. If in that counterfactual world one fares less well economically than one does 
in our world, then one is not harmed economically. This claim has no implications for 
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the kind of counterfactual scenario that is appropriate when attempting to identify 
other, non-economic, forms of harm. Thus, we can readily accept that the envisaged 
millionaire is harmed by the sexual harassment she suffers, even if she would be less 
well off economically in a fully just world. 
The upshot of these considerations is that we should reject the above attempt to salvage 
the Harm-Based Discrimination Argument, and thus that we are not entitled to appeal 
to this argument in order to sustain the conclusion that Lawrence and other female 
millionaires are victims of wrongful discrimination. 
3.3 Discrimination and Disrespect     
So far, we have focused exclusively on individuals’ economic entitlements. But this 
approach is too narrow, since it overlooks the way in which inequalities can express an 
insulting message about the comparative moral worth of the victims and beneficiaries, 
and how the expression of such a message can be disrespectful. This idea is a powerfully 
intuitive one. It helps to explain what is so morally abhorrent about laws that require 
black passengers to sit at the back of the bus, or policies that offer payments to 
minorities to emigrate (Hellman 2011; Gerver 2018; Anderson and Pildes 2000). 
Failing to recognise the symbolic significance of these policies is failing to recognise the 
nature of the injustice that the victims suffer. It might be argued that we can sustain 
similar judgements in the cases with which we are concerned. This is the Disrespect-
Based Discrimination Argument. 
This argument rests on the claim that paying female celebrities less than their male 
counterparts expresses an insulting message about their comparative moral worth, and 
perhaps also about the comparative moral worth of men and women more generally, 
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and that we should object to millionaire inequalities on this basis.20 Importantly, this 
argument is not concerned with what an agent intends his acts to express. Rather, it’s 
concerned with how his acts can reasonably be interpreted. If an act can reasonably be 
interpreted as insulting, performing that act can be disrespectful, regardless of whether 
the insult is intended. These considerations allow us to condemn conduct as wrongfully 
discriminatory on the basis of the message it sends, without having to inspect the 
intentions of those acting. 
One advantage of the Disrespect-Based Discrimination Argument is that it furnishes us 
with a response to the Market Demand Reply. To see how it does this, let’s consider a 
US Supreme Court case from 1964, in which an Alabaman restaurant, Ollie’s 
Barbeque, refused to open its doors to black customers following the enactment of the 
Civil Rights Act on the grounds that, if it were required to do so, the restaurant ‘would 
lose a substantial amount of business’ (Katzenbach v. McClung 1964: 297).21 The 
injustice of the owner’s conduct can be fully explicated only if reference is made to the 
insulting message that it conveyed. Intentionally or otherwise, the owner’s act sends a 
clear symbolic message, namely that black and white customers are not moral equals. 
Given the social context in which it’s performed, and how it could reasonably be 
expected to be perceived in light of this context, the owner’s act is deeply disrespectful. 
In 1964 Alabama, black citizens were routinely treated as moral inferiors and had been 
subject to unequal and unjust treatment for centuries. Part of this unjust treatment 
 
20 Gheaus reaches the same conclusion (forthcoming). Part of the distinctive contribution of our paper is 
to reinforce this conviction, by exploring the nature of this disrespect-based wrong, especially in the light 
of the Market Demand Reply.  
21 We have simplified our presentation of this complex legal case so as to focus on the aspect that is most 
relevant to assessing the plausibility of the Market Demand Reply. 
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consisted precisely in segregation and in refusing black citizens entry to various 
establishments. Refusing to admit black customers is disrespectful, regardless of the 
owner’s intentions, in virtue of this unjust social background, and the role it plays in 
determining how the action is reasonably interpreted. In other words, refusing 
admission is disrespectful because it’s expressively in line with the enforcement of racial 
hierarchy and segregation (Anderson and Pildes 2000: 1528).  
Moreover, the fact that the owner was (allegedly) acting only to maximise profits does 
little to mitigate the disrespectfulness of their act. The judgement that they have acted 
disrespectfully is grounded in their failure to be adequately responsive to the social 
context in which they were acting, and to the social meaning that this context would 
inevitably lend to their conduct. A crucial implication of these observations is that the 
Market Demand Reply is insufficient to stave off assertions of wrongful discrimination 
when the conduct in question expresses an insulting message, as it does in this case. 
Importantly, it seems plausible to hold that these considerations transfer over to the 
case of millionaire inequality. Even if unequal remuneration really does reflect 
variations in the level of market demand for celebrities’ talents, such remuneration 
plausibly remains wrongfully discriminatory given the insulting message that it’s likely 
to convey regarding the comparative moral worth of men and women (Gheaus 
forthcoming). Contemporary liberal societies, including Britain and the US, do not treat 
women in a manner that is comparable to the manner in which 1960s Alabama treated 
African Americans. Nevertheless, these societies have deeply sexist histories. In the 
recent past, these societies have upheld practices that deprived women of vitally 
important goods (such as the right to vote and to own property) and that failed to protect 
women from serious harms (such as marital rape). Moreover, these societies continue 
to be marked by deep gender inequalities. Women suffer from a variety of serious 
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inequities, including a disproportionate burden of household labour, high levels of 
domestic violence, negative stereotyping, and socio-political marginalization (Satz 
2010: 144-146). Given this social context, it’s reasonable to regard unequal 
remuneration as insulting, whatever its actual source. Employers who pay women less 
than men often fail to be adequately responsive to the social context in which they are 
acting, and to the meaning that their acts can reasonably be expected to convey in light 
of that context. This is a failure of respect. 
In drawing the parallels that we have drawn, we do not mean to claim that the symbolic 
content in cases of millionaire inequality is as unambiguously disrespectful as it is in 
paradigmatic examples of racial injustice. In the example of Ollie’s Barbeque, the 
restaurant claims to be acting on market demand shaped by explicit prejudice on the 
part of its patrons. However, in cases of millionaire inequality, we grant that employers 
may be providing unequal remuneration on the basis of consumer demand that is not 
motivated by explicit prejudice. Some critics of our analysis might argue that this 
difference renders cases of millionaire inequality invulnerable to the Disrespect-Based 
Discrimination Argument. We disagree. What matters is that, in both cases, the acts 
with which we are concerned are widely and reasonably understood (particularly 
amongst the victims) to express a disrespectful message about the comparative moral 
worth of different individuals.  
These issues are part of a larger picture regarding the systematic oppression of members 
of a socially salient group (Young 2011: ch. 7). Our observations emphasise that cases 
of millionaire inequality occur within the context of a world in which women of all 
backgrounds are systematically disadvantaged relative to men, and perhaps it’s these 
facts that make Lawrence’s complaints so serious.  
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4. Extending Our Arguments?  
We started this article by noting that cases of millionaire inequality elicit conflicting 
intuitions. Whereas the unequal remuneration involved looks like a troubling case of 
gender injustice, it’s natural to feel uneasy when confronted with the suggestion that 
multimillionaires are somehow being paid inadequately, given their fortunes. Crucially, 
however, these celebrities are not the only class of people who have more wealth than 
that to which they are entitled. Many people who are less wealthy than millionaires but 
who are nevertheless well-off plausibly also have more than their just share. Indeed, it 
is not completely implausible to think that this is true of even the average citizen of a 
rich society, including (we suspect) many readers of this paper. This should prompt us 
to reflect on the extent to which our conclusions generalise beyond society’s very 
highest earners to those who are only moderately well-off. We do not deny that our 
conclusions can be generalised, but, in this final section, we shall note some obstacles 
to doing so.  
Let’s begin with the Fairness Argument, which we argued provides no compelling basis 
on which to rectify millionaire inequalities. This is because, according to the Just 
Holdings Condition, improving the fairness of a distribution is intrinsically valuable 
only when the distribuenda are justly held, which is not true of individuals who earn 
vastly more than that to which they are entitled.  
At first glance, we might expect fairness-based arguments in the context of those who 
are moderately well-off to be defeated by the same kinds of considerations that defeat 
those arguments in the context of the super-rich. But on reflection, this is a little too 
quick. To see why, note that there are two senses in which celebrities such as Lawrence 
can be said to earn more than that to which they are entitled. First, they lack a justified 
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claim to their earnings because their enormous wealth entails a huge missed 
opportunity to alleviate the severe disadvantages of the world’s poorest. Because each 
millionaire has so much, there is a lot that they can do for those who have little. Second, 
when millionaires are unfairly paid less than their counterparts, the material benefits 
they forgo are extravagant luxuries.22  
Moreover, it is plausible that, if these millionaires were to relinquish their excess 
wealth, this would free up sufficient resources to eliminate severe poverty. In other 
words, were they to give up their luxuries, contenting themselves instead with the level 
of wealth held by the moderately advantaged, extreme deprivation might cease to exist.   
In contrast to the wealth that is unjustly held by the super-rich, the wealth that is held 
by any moderately well-off individual need not represent an excessively large forgone 
opportunity to assist the world’s poor. Furthermore, if those who are extremely wealthy 
were to relinquish their opulence, the wealth held by the moderately advantaged might 
be unnecessary to alleviate severe poverty. Finally, the benefits foregone by moderately 
well-off victims of unfairness need not be trivial. If an average citizen of an affluent 
country is treated unfairly at work, for example, and thereby earns a smaller income 
than some of her colleagues, the benefits that she forgoes can be significant. From the 
perspective of alleviating global poverty, then, the reasons for which the wealth of 
millionaires is unjustly held do not translate straightforwardly to the wealth of the 
moderately-advantaged.  
 
22 More extremely, we might even conceptualize these resources as ‘surplus money’, meaning that we 
should give wealth above a certain level zero moral weight in comparison with urgent claims to those 
funds. For example, see Robeyns (2017). For related discussion, see Frank (2010: ch. 5).  
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In Section 2.2, we noted (but did not explore) several additional reasons for why the 
wealth of millionaires may be unjustly held, besides the fact that it represents a failed 
opportunity to rectify severe disadvantage. For example, we noted that egalitarians 
might invoke the unfairness of the vastly superior prospects enjoyed by the wealthy 
compared to others, the pernicious effects that great economic inequalities have on 
social relations, enabling some to have power over and dominate others, and the 
detrimental effects such inequalities tend to have on political procedures. Further 
investigation is needed in order to determine whether any of these additional reasons 
render the wealth of the moderately advantaged unjustly held as well.  
What should we say about the various Discrimination Arguments that we considered 
in Section 3? Do our conclusions about these arguments generalise beyond society’s 
very highest earners? Again, there are some reasons to think not. In the first instance, 
it bears emphasizing that the causes of the gender pay gap throughout most of the 
income distribution may differ from the causes of Hollywood’s gender pay gap, which 
we have supposed is partly to do with differences in market demand. For the 
overwhelming majority of women, their lower earnings is nothing to do with this factor. 
Rather, studies suggest that it is often a product of the gendered division of labour and, 
more specifically, the fact that, since most mothers have primary responsibility for 
childcare, they must find forms of employment that are compatible with the demands 
of family life.23  
 
23 For discussion, see Kleven et. al (2019). Of course, other factors, such as number of years in education 
and corporate culture, may exert an influence as well, even at the upper end of the income distribution. 
For discussion, see Burkhauser et. al (Working Paper) and Keller, Molina, and Olney (Working Paper).  
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What is more, some studies suggest that, even when considerations of market demand 
do not arise, the causes of the gender pay gap among the super-rich differ from the 
causes of the gender pay gap throughout most of the income distribution.24 That is to 
say that, as a general matter, the barriers facing society’s highest earning women – 
whether in Hollywood or elsewhere – likely differ from those facing most other women 
in the labour market. If this is the case, then there is a clear reason to treat cases of 
millionaire inequality as a distinctive phenomenon, such that we should avoid 
extending our arguments further down the income distribution. 
To conclude, we would like to emphasise a final point. Irrespective of the extent to 
which our conclusions in this paper generalise beyond Hollywood, we believe that there 
are a host of further reasons to object to society’s gender pay gap, many of which take 
issue with the deeply unjust gendered social norms that profoundly affect our lives.25 
None of our arguments count against the existence of such reasons or, indeed, imply 
that they are less forceful than commonly assumed. After all, to deny that there is 
anything intrinsically valuable, say, about a fair distribution of income between 
moderately well-off men and women would not be to say that there are no weighty 
reasons to overturn the social norms that sustain the existing pattern of economic 
inequality between them.  
 
24 This claim is supported by the fact that various government policies, such as parental leave schemes, 
that improve most women’s employment opportunities have no effect on, and may even be detrimental 
to, the prospects of society’s highest-earning women. See Corekcioglu, Francesconi, and Kunze 
(Working Paper).  
25 For examples of such objections, see Gheaus (2012), Okin (1989), Schouten (2019), Watson and 
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